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RESUMEN
El propósito de este artículo es comprender la relación que existe, en la filosofía 
de Hegel, entre su concepción del “hábito” y la de “el mundo del derecho”, en 
tanto ambas son definidas por Hegel como “segunda naturaleza”. En primer 
lugar, nos centraremos en la concepción hegeliana del hábito, tal y como fue 
formulada en su antropología (la primera sección de la filosofía del espíritu 
subjetivo). A continuación, expondremos la conexión entre el concepto de há-
bito y el de costumbre, tal y como fue formulado en la filosofía del derecho. Fi-
nalmente, sobre esta base, ofreceremos un análisis de algunas de las estructuras 
fundamentales de la concepción hegeliana del Estado como “realidad efectiva 
de la idea ética”.
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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to understand the relationship that exists, in Hegel’s 
philosophy, between his conception of “habit” and that of “the world of right”, 
insofar as both are defined by Hegel as “second nature”. First of all, we will fo-
cus on the Hegelian conception of habit, as it is formulated in his anthropology 
(first section of the philosophy of subjective spirit). Secondly, we will show the 
connection between the concept of habit and that of custom, as it is formulated 
in the philosophy of right. Finally, on this basis we will provide an insight into 
some of the fundamental structures of the Hegelian conception of the State as 
the “actuality of the ethical idea”.
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The social and political world, regarded from the 
point of view of its objective consistency, is defined 
by Hegel as “custom” and works to all intents and 
purposes as a second nature: “in simple identity 
with the actuality of individuals, ethical life [das 
Sittliche] appears as their general mode of conduct, 
i.e. as custom [Sitte], and the habit [Gewohnheit] 
of ethical living appears as a second nature” (GPR, §151). Virtue is then 
the individuals’ capacity to act according to their own customs, i.e. to 
be accustomed to social life (GPR, §150), in a way that, from the point 
of view of the individual, always appears as a task and therefore implies 
1 Abbreviations used (where not indicated, the translation is mine):
GPR= Outlines of Philosophy of Right. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008 [Grundlinien der 
Philosophie des Rechts, in Gesammelte Werke (from now on GW). Hamburg, Meiner, 1968 
sgg., Vol. 14,1, 2009].
Enz2= Philosophy of Nature. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004 [Philosophie der Natur, 
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), in GW. Vol. 20, 1992].
Enz3= Philosophy of Mind. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2007 [Philosophie des Geistes, 
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), in GW. Vol. 20, 
1992]. For reasons of uniformity, I modify the translation of “Geist” from “mind” to “spirit”.
Rph 24/25= Philosophie des Rechts nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift K.G. v. Griesheims 1824-
25, in Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie. 4 Vols. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-
Holzboog, 1973-1974, Vol. 4, pp. 67-752.
PhG1= Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes. Wintersemester 1827/28. 
Nachschrift Stolzenberg, in GW. Vol. 25,2, 2011.
PhG2= Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827-8. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007 
[Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes. Berlin 1827/28, in Vorlesungen. 
Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte. Vol. 13., Hamburg, Meiner, 1994].
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a dimension of unavoidable contingency.2 This essay aims precisely to 
determine the relationship, which Hegel establishes in this passage of 
his philosophy of right, between habit, custom and ethical life. On this 
basis, it will be possible to elucidate some of the fundamental aspects 
of Hegel’s conception of the State, with special regard to the meaning 
he attributes to political government. We will begin with the analysis of 
the Hegelian conception of habit, through which man’s “second nature” 
is constituted (Enz3, §410 Anm.). The concept of habit finds its system-
atic collocation in the philosophy of subjective spirit: to it, then, we will 
now turn our attention.
1. Habit
The philosophy of subjective spirit is subdivided into the sections of 
anthropology, phenomenology and psychology, respectively dedicated 
to the soul, the consciousness and the spirit (theoretical and practical).3 
It is on the first section, anthropology, that we must focus, because it is 
there that the concept of habit appears, playing a leading role (Enz3, 
§§409-410).4 The “strange beauty” that Catherine Malabou recognises 
in Hegelian anthropology5 can be ascribed to its problematic character: 
this section, which should show the separation of spirit from nature, is 
in fact the point of their maximum indistinction. Hegel says indeed that 
“even animals have souls [in a sense]” (PhG2, 71; PhG1, 577).6 Hence the 
paradoxical situation whereby what should constitute the specificity of 
the study of man (anthropology) is precisely what man has in common 
with the animal. This paradox can be understood if one takes into ac-
count what Hegel means by “soul”: he does not refer to the Cartesian 
res cogitans, nor to the eighteenth-century rational psychology, much 
2 The ethical relationship exists, that is, it has its “erscheinende Gestalt” (GPR, §145), in the 
action of individual self-consciousness, which will know how to achieve it better or worse; on 
this matter, however, philosophy has nothing to say. Here we touch on one of the fundamental 
aspects of the logic of the philosophy of objective spirit (as finite spirit); see Nicolò Fazioni. Il 
problema della contingenza. Logica e politica in Hegel. Milano, Franco Angeli, 2015, in parti-
cular pp. 211-231.
3 In this way, Hegel breaks up with tradition: psychology traditionally dealt with the Seele 
(soul), while for Hegel it is addressed to the Geist.
4 Among the endless critical literature on Hegel’s anthropology, I limit myself to mentioning, 
in addition to the texts that will be cited below, Luca Corti. Pensare l’esperienza. Una lettura 
dell’antropologia di Hegel. Bologna, Pendragon, 2016.
5 See Catherine Malabou. The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic. London, 
Routledge, 2005, p. 23.
6 The addition “in a sense” (gewissermaßen) appears in PhG1, that is a new edition of the sa-
me lectures of PhG2, based on another Nachschrift (Stolzenberg). 
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less to physiognomy or phrenology, but to the terminology of Aristo-
tle: “Aristotle’s books on the soul […] are […] still the most admirable, 
perhaps even the sole, work of speculative interest on this topic” (Enz3, 
§378). Hegel’s philosophical operation consists therefore in preserving 
a human character for the soul (in so far as it is the object of anthro-
pology), while at the same time developing its exposition against the 
background of Aristotle’s De anima, where, as is known, psyché defines 
the principle of the living being as such.7 All the moments of Hegel’s 
anthropology, including habit, can “more or less” or “in a certain sense” 
be ascribed also to the animal; however, they come at the same time to 
bring out the specificity of the properly human world, i.e. its “second 
nature”. The consequences of this approach are critical. Hegel’s anthro-
pology, inasmuch as it brings forth the transition from the living being 
to custom, as we shall see, leaves no room for the emergence of the 
figure of man. In this sense, it follows an alternative path with respect 
to Kant’s anthropology and thus avoids that anthropological illusion 
which, according to Foucault, Kant leaves as a heritage to a considerable 
part of contemporary thought.8
It is to be started from Hegel’s conception of the highest mani-
festation of the “first” nature, that is the living organism and more 
precisely the animal (Enz2, §§ 350 ff.).9 According to Hegel, the 
living being is a sort of folding of nature onto itself, an exterior that 
has become interior: a unity “which is fulfilled (erfüllt), and as self-
related negative unity, has essentially developed the nature of self 
7 The well-known reference is to Aristotle. De anima. A, 1. On the Hegelian concept of soul, 
see Bernard Bourgeois. “Les deux âmes: de la nature à l’esprit”, in Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron 
(ed.): De Saint Thomas à Hegel. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1994, pp. 117-151.
8 Malabou rightly states that “the Hegelian man is above all a man of habits, and that means, 
paradoxically, a disappearing subject”. She goes even further and sees in the habit “the 
death of man” (Catherine Malabou. The Future of Hegel…, pp. 75-76). In my opinion, these 
statements acquire their meaning if they are read with reference to the Foucauldian reading 
of modern episteme as the age of man (I refer to Michel Foucault. The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London-New York, Routledge, 2002). Foucault’s inter-
pretation finds its starting point in his reading of Kant’s Anthropology (see Michel Foucault. 
Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Los Angeles, Semiotext(e), 
2008). In this respect, one can agree with Zizek when he states that “Hegel provides the 
immanent corrective to Kantian modernity” (Slavoj Zizek. Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the 
Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. London, Verso, 2012, p. 341). In addition to Aristotle, Hegel 
is evidently inspired, in his anthropology, by the reflection of the German Spätaufklärung; on the 
Hegel-Herder report see the works of Michael N. Forster (After Herder. Philosophy of Language 
in the German Tradition. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010; “Bildung bei Herder und seinen 
Nachfolgern”, in Klaus Vieweg and Michael Winkler (eds.): Bildung und Freiheit. Ein vergesse-
ner Zusammenhang. Paderborn, Schöningh, 2012, pp. 75-89).
9 On the Hegelian conception of the living being, I refer to the works of Luca Illetterati (Natura 
e ragione. Sullo sviluppo dell’idea di natura in Hegel. Trento, Verifiche, 1995; “Vita e organismo 
nella filosofia della natura”, in Franco Chiereghin (ed.): Filosofia e scienze filosofiche nell’“Enci-
clopedia” hegeliana del 1817. Trento, Verifiche, 1995, pp. 337-427).
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[selbstische] and become subjective [subjektive]” (Enz2, §337). While 
a stone simply is there, in the way of a Ding, of a thing, the be-
ing of the living organism has a different quality, since it is identi-
fied with a process: “It is only as this self-reproductive being, not 
as a mere being (nicht als Seiendes), that the living creature is and 
preserves itself ” (Enz2, §352). When this no longer happens, that 
is, when its being coincides with the result and no longer with its 
continuous reproduction, then the living being becomes “the corpse 
of the life-process” (Enz2, §337) and re-joins the immediacy of the 
geological nature. Again, it was Aristotle who produced the deepest 
understanding of the living being (which “has in modern times been 
almost forgotten”), this time accompanied by Kant, who, in the Cri-
tique of Judgement, “in his own way revived this concept” (Enz2, §360 
Anm.). Keeping these two main references in the background, He-
gel distinguishes three aspects of the animal organism. The first one 
is the internal differentiation of its figure, which continuously pro-
duces itself while maintaining the ideality of its members. Secondly, 
the animal is defined by its having an environment,10 from which it 
differs qualitatively as the interior from the exterior and with which 
it comes into some determined contact (lack and impulse).11 Finally, 
copulation is interpreted by Hegel as the moment in which the ani-
mal searches externally not for its alterity (for example, food), but 
for its identity; that is, he aims to produce an identification start-
ing from the difference of himself from himself (in two individuals). 
This process also defines the limit of the animal, since the unification 
falls out of the two individuals in relation, that is, it becomes exist-
ing in a third individual (the offspring): this is what Hegel calls “the 
process of the genus”. The animal is not able to make this second 
fold: it continuously unfolds in the uninterrupted flow of generation, 
this “bad infinity” that “preserves itself only through the destruction 
of the individuals” (Enz2, §370) – although, evidently, it is at the 
same time their condition of possibility.
10 Of course Hegel does not use this term, which acquires a specifically biological meaning 
(and not physical, as it is in Newton and again in Lamarck) only afterwards, with Comte and 
especially with Darwin: see Georges Canguilhem. “The Living and its Milieu”, in Paola Marrati 
and Todd Meyers (eds.): Knowledge of Life. New York, Fordham University Press, 2008, 
pp. 98-120.
11 Slavoj Zizek (Less Than Nothing…, pp. 192-196) states, with reference to the studies of 
Valera and Maturana, that “the language of contemporary biology starts to resemble, quite 
uncannily, the language of Hegel”. For a more in-depth analysis in this direction see Francesca 
Michelini. “Thinking Life. Hegel’s Conceptualization of Living Being as an Autopoietic Theory 
of Organized Systems”, in Luca Illetterati and Francesca Michelini (eds.): Purposiveness: 
Teleology Between Nature and Mind. Frankfurt am Main, Ontos, 2008, pp. 75-96. 
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If we now ask where we can find this ability of life to fold back onto 
itself, the answer is clear: der Geist, the spirit. On the determination 
of this threshold it seems that Hegel has never stopped interrogating 
himself. In the Phenomenology of Spirit (which, however, is a work that 
responds to other problems), this role is occupied by self-consciousness: 
“life points to something other than itself, viz. to consciousness, for 
which life exists as this unity, or as genus”.12 The recognition, that the 
animal fails by being continuously re-displaced in the whirlpool of re-
production, is made possible only in the relationship between two con-
sciousnesses. This solution, however, limits itself to the acknowledgment 
of the irruption of an irreducible principle (the consciousness, the spirit) 
that would sanction in advance, from above, the abyss that separates 
man from the animal. But already in the first edition of the Encyclopae-
dia (1817) the discourse takes a different turn: between organic physics 
(which is addressed to life) and phenomenology (which is addressed 
to consciousness) anthropology is inserted, which is addressed, as said, 
to the soul.13 The latter concept therefore has the fundamental task of 
showing how life’s folding back onto itself takes place.
According to the ordinary way of thinking, which empirical psychol-
ogy shares with ordinary representation, “the soul is presupposed as a 
ready-made subject” (Enz3, §387 Anm.) that takes possession of the 
body. Instead, the point of view of the concept is inverted: the soul is 
nothing more than the process through which the body takes possession 
of itself, that is, determines its norm of life. It is precisely because of this 
that it is difficult to attribute the soul’s determinations exclusively to 
man: even if Hegel presents them in this way, it is clear that they also 
concern other living beings and especially animals, although this does 
not mean that they concern them in the same way.
At first, the course of the body is conditioned in the most general 
way by natural characteristics: on the one hand, its own living environ-
ment (climates, seasons, ...), race differences and individual peculiari-
ties (“the mode of the varying temperament, talent, character, physiog-
nomy”, Enz3, §395); on the other hand, the course of the ages of life, 
sexual difference and the alternation between sleep and wakefulness. 
The first contraction of this trend is given by sensation, immediate un-
ion of internal and external, the simplest form of presence of the body 
12 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1977, p. 109.
13 On the genesis of anthropology as a philosophical science, see Franco Chiereghin. 
“L’antropologia come scienza filosofica”, in Franco Chiereghin (ed.): Filosofia e scienze filosofi-
che…, pp. 429-454.
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to itself (Enz3, §400). The fundamental point, however, is that the liv-
ing being never limits itself to experiencing sensations, but remains 
within himself in the incessant flow of sensations, which are precisely 
its own. In this sense the soul is “simple ideality, subjectivity of sensa-
tion” (Enz3, §403) that doubles and folds the living subjectivity. The 
first two forms in which this unity manifests itself are those which in 
man appear as illnesses: on the one hand, the dizziness of an immediate 
and all-pervasive feeling, which Hegel reconnects to the forms of “ani-
mal magnetism” or “somnambulism” of which Mesmer speaks; on the 
other hand, the fixation on a single type of sensations from which the 
subjective unity is totally absorbed, in which Hegel recognizes madness 
(Enz3, §408). But if we overcome these manifestations and look for 
the way in which the subjectivity of the soul becomes effective, that is, 
makes itself the negative unity of its sensations, we finally arrive at the 
thematization of habit.
Hegel attributes absolute importance to this concept and this is the 
real watershed that separates his anthropology from that of Kant or, 
more precisely, that shows their belonging to two alternative epistemic 
orders. This is not only because Kant, in the brief treatise he dedicates to 
habit (in §12 of the first book of Anthropology), conceives it only nega-
tively as a “mere mechanism of applying power” that deprives actions 
of their moral worth and that must therefore be clearly distinguished 
from virtue.14 Even more important is what Kant affirms in the preface, 
when he identifies in the very existence of different customs and human 
habits one of the major obstacles to the elevation of anthropology to 
the rank of science: “Conditions of time and place, when lasting, result 
in habits which, it is said, constitute second nature, which makes man’s 
judgment of himself more difficult”.15 The “second nature” constituted 
by habits and customs tends to cover up the true human nature, that is, 
it hinders the emergence of the figure of man to which anthropology 
aims. For Hegel, such a distinction is impossible, because the “nature” of 
man coincides with his capacity to acquire habits (with his “second na-
ture”), which means that there is, strictly speaking, no “nature of man”.16
14 “Virtue […] is moral strength in pursuit of one’s duty, a duty which should never be a 
matter of habit, but should always proceed, fresh and original, from one’s mode of thought” 
(Immanuel Kant. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Carbondale, Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1996, p. 32). For a more comprehensive interpretation of the concept of ha-
bit in Kant, see the contribution of Giulia Valpione in this same volume.
15 Immanuel Kant. Anthropology…, p. 101.
16 This is why the Hegelian notion of habit has sometimes been associated with that of Félix 
Ravaisson. (De l’habitude, 1837): see for instance Catherine Malabou. The Future of Hegel…, 
pp. 57-58, and Jan van der Meulen. “Hegels Lehre von Leib, Seele und Geist”, Hegel-Studien, 
Vol. 2, 1963, pp. 251-274, here p. 263. Malabou, in the preface to the English edition of 
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The topic of habit, which gains more and more space in the various 
encyclopaedic expositions, is for Hegel “a hard point in the organiza-
tion of spirit”, indeed “it is one of the most difficult determinations” 
(Enz3, §410 Anm.).17 This is probably due to the fact that “we are ha-
bituated to the representation of habit [wir sind an der Vorstellung der 
Gewohnheit gewöhnt]; nevertheless to determine the concept of habit is 
difficult” (Enz3, §410 Zusatz). If we wanted to take the pun seriously, 
we could say that the difficulty lies in the fact that men are primarily 
habituated to having habits, or even that they are nothing more than 
their own habits. In the usual representation it is believed that it is 
always “someone” (a given subject) who contracts a habit as a result of 
his decision (such as learning to play an instrument), or for his weak-
ness (such as the gambling habit) and so on. The point of view of the 
concept, instead, forces us to look at the thing in the opposite direction, 
because it is precisely through the acquisition of habits that is consti-
tuted that very same subject that the representation takes as a presup-
position: “habit is the greatest power [Macht] in the individual; it is the 
individual himself ” (PhG2, 157; see PhG1, 735). Habit is a process of 
appropriation of the body. However, this does not mean that someone 
(the soul) appropriates it; it is rather the body itself that appropriates 
itself, that shows itself to itself as its negative unity and that produces 
itself as a subjectivity different from its own immediate corporeity, 
which is pushed back into ideality.
Habit consists of a process of repetition [Wiederholung]: “This self-
incorporation of the particularity or bodiliness of the determinations 
of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them, and 
the production of habit appears as practice” (Enz3, §410). The notion 
Ravaisson’s text (On Habit. London, Continuum, 2008), distinguishes two basic ways of spe-
aking of habit: “Initiated by Aristotle, continued by Hegel and taken up by a certain current of 
French philosophy (Maine de Biran, Ravaisson, Bergson), the first sees in habit a primary onto-
logical phenomenon. […] The second way, initiated by Descartes and continued by Kant, sees 
in habit the epitome of inauthenticity, a simulacrum of being, an imitation of virtue” (Catherine 
Malabou. “Preface”, in Félix Ravaisson: On Habit…, vii). This partitioning is perhaps too sche-
matic (for an accurate reconstruction of the history of the concept of habit see Gerhard Funke. 
“Gewohnheit”, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, Nº 3, 1958, pp. 9-606, in particular 496-518). 
However, it is undeniable that on many aspects the handling of habit in Hegel and Ravaisson 
has strong similarities; they depend however on the common reference to Aristotle rather than 
on their overall philosophical approach, which is instead completely incompatible (as known, 
Ravaisson considered himself anti-Hegelian and pupil of the last Schelling).
17 In the 1830 edition, the paragraphs referring to habit are entirely rewritten compared to 
those of 1827, which clearly shows Hegel’s continuous work on this section. On Hegelian 
concept of habit see John McCumber. “Hegel on Habit”, The Owl of Minerva, Vol. 21, Nº 2, 
1990, pp. 155-165; Christoph Menke. “Autonomie und Befreiung”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie, Vol. 58, Nº 5, 2010, pp. 675-694; Filippo Ranchio. Dimensionen der zweiten 
Natur. Hegels Praktische Philosophie, Hamburg, Meiner, 2016, pp. 189 sgg.
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of repetition acquires here an entirely singular significance in Hegel’s 
system. In general, in fact, repetition is the universal sign of impotence, 
a run around that reveals the inability to assume the speculative point 
of view. Whether it is the repetition of an experience of consciousness, 
in the Phenomenology, or the reappearance of the same category, in the 
Science of Logic, we always have to deal with the failure of dialectical 
advancement, with the prison in which the intellect is locked up. Rep-
etition, in this way, is always only (bloß, nur, ...) repetition, “empty unrest 
of a progression”,18 in which “the progress is neither an advance nor a 
gain but rather a repetition of one and the same move, a positing, a 
sublating, and then again a positing and a sublating”.19 In other words, 
where there is Wiederholung there is no Aufhebung. In the case of habit, 
instead, repetition appears as a productive force. It cannot be said that 
in these paragraphs a different logic is introduced surreptitiously into 
the Hegelian system; rather, we must recognise that repetition is at this 
point the determined form that the Aufhebung assumes:20 the liberation of 
the subject from his immediate identification with the body, the capac-
ity to maintain the sensations in their ideality, is produced through their 
repeated exercise.
This process has first of all a formal or negative meaning: it frees us 
from the immediate adherence to vital needs (mediated by sensations), 
which, by virtue of their being exercised (and not denied: “monkish re-
nunciation and forcible repression do not free us from them”, Enz3, §410 
Anm.), are internalised to the point of becoming indifferent. Repetition 
here coincides with getting used to something in such a way as to weak-
en its impression, a bit like when one no longer notices a background 
noise, or like one’s eyes do when, on awakening, they quickly become 
accustomed to light. This is the side where habit coincides with harden-
ing (Abhärtung, PhG2, 154) with regard to external sensations and to the 
appetites and impulses proper to the living being. As a result, the latter 
are no longer the main occupation (they are performed “without think-
ing about it”) and the soul makes itself available “to other activity and 
occupations, in the sphere of sensation and the spirit’s consciousness in 
general” (Enz3, §410).
Now, the key point is that even these “other activity and occupations” 
from which the hardened subject has freed himself, whatever they may 
18 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. The Science of Logic. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, p. 113.
19 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. The Science of Logic…, p. 192.
20 On this point I disagree with Catherine Malabou. The Future of Hegel…, p. 26: “the transi-
tion from nature to spirit occurs not as a sublation, but as a reduplication, a process through 
which spirit constitutes itself in and as a second nature”.
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be, still require habit in order to reach effective existence. This is the side 
whereby habit is not hardness, but adroitness or dexterity (Geschickli-
chkeit: Enz3, §410 Anm; PhG2, 156). Here repetition is revealed in its 
productive side: in the exercise the body becomes an instrument, that 
is, it acquires its faculties, which become immediately its own and can 
be reproduced at any time.21 Habit is thus the retroactive creation of 
the faculty that manifests itself in it, insofar as it constantly produces 
its own presupposition. From this point of view, “habit is a form that 
embraces all kinds and stages of spirit’s activity” (Enz3, §410 Anm.) and 
in fact even “thinking, though wholly free, and active in the pure element 
of itself, likewise requires habit and familiarity” (Enz3, §410 Anm.). In 
other words, according to Hegel, habit is not only liberation from what 
one is habituated to (in this case, to be habituated to thinking would be 
equivalent to having finally freed oneself from thought), but it is also 
a condition for the exercise of freedom, a productive force that makes 
the body capable of possessing a capacity on a permanent basis. Obvi-
ously, this does not mean that for Hegel thought, as well as any other 
activity of spirit, can be reduced to habit: the latter is only a formal 
element that is aufgehoben, maintained and exceeded (as is the case for 
all other determinations: when I think, I am also alive, conscious, etc.). 
Nevertheless, within habit emerges in all its strength a decisive charac-
teristic of spirit, which Catherine Malabou rightly defines as its plastic-
ity. Spirit, that is, is not an expression of an essence or content given in 
advance, like an infinite reserve of meaning that awaits to be revealed, 
but is entirely resolved into the process of its manifestation. In Hegel’s 
words: “[spirit] does not reveal something; its determinacy and content is 
this very revelation” (Enz3, §383). It can therefore be affirmed that habit 
itself (or rather the habituated body: the subject as “actual soul”, Enz3, 
§411) constitutes the true threshold that separates spirit from nature. 
Repetition, which in the living subject continually unfolds in the bad 
infinity of the process of generation, here makes a fold and contracts 
into productive repetition.
This result suggests that habit is a capacity peculiar only to humans, 
from which animals, as simple living beings, are excluded. Nevertheless, 
Hegel seems to be singularly undecided in this regard. In the Lectures 
on the Philosophy of Spirit of 1827-1828, he states: “another observa-
tion can be made on animals, which in turn have habits, in the sense 
of adroitness [Geschicklichkeit]” (PhG1, 735-736; see PhG2, 130). Hegel 
21 See PhG2, 156 (PhG1, 733-734). Zizek gets the point very well: “Hegel emphasizes again 
and again that there is no freedom without habit: habit provides the background and founda-
tion for every exercise of freedom” (Less Than Nothing…, p. 342).
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refers here to the practice of training [Abrichtung], which “can go pretty 
far in approaching the miraculous, even the human sphere” (PhG2, 157-
158). However, training always requires external intervention that ex-
trinsically connects the animal’s sensation to the activity to be learned 
(e.g. a food reward). In any case, the animal’s ability to be trained tells us 
that the animal is structurally capable of habit, if by this term we mean, 
in general, the ability to actively and creatively interact with the envi-
ronment. According to Hegel, the animal “is a Self [Selbst]”, not only 
in the sense of the vital process mentioned above, but also because it is 
able, in a certain way, to bring sensations back to their ideality and thus 
differentiate from them a subjective dimension (a soul in the Hegelian 
sense). The animal is not a machine that reacts automatically to the 
environment, but is able to move autonomously in it, that is, to invent 
new ways of satisfying its own needs. From this point of view, Catherine 
Malabou is right in stating that “habit is not essentially a property of 
man” but is indeed proper to every living being. The inevitable conse-
quence is that “for Hegel nature is always second nature”.22
If, however, we stick close to Hegel’s precise conceptual determina-
tion of habit, then the matter changes. It is true that living subjectivity is 
always duplicated in a subjectivity that we could define as “normative”, 
because it connects sensation and activity; however, the animal “does 
not make this connection apart from its instincts [Instinkt]” (PhG2, 
15723). When the animal seems to come out of it, for example if you train 
it to imitate human activities, it is actually an external intervention that 
orients the instinctual connection (food reward, etc.). In other words, it 
must certainly be recognized that the animal is able to actively produce 
differentiated behaviours, in the sense that instinct can be satisfied in 
many ways (there is not a “natural” one). However, these behaviours 
will always be declinations of the satisfaction of the same instinct, from 
whose circle the animal does not come out. In this sense, the “habit” of 
the animal does not really take it away from the genre that in its in-
stincts manifests itself: not by chance, Hegel calls this the “habit of liv-
ing” (Enz3, §410 Anm.; see Enz3, §375). Gewohnheit in the strict sense, 
on the other hand, indicates precisely the human capacity to get out of 
this circle, in the double movement that has been seen: on the one hand, 
Abhärtung frees from vital impulses by means of habituation; on the 
other hand, Geschicklichkeit is the capacity to contract completely new 
habits, regardless of any instinctual pre-determination, i.e. strictly spir-
itual manifestations. As much as we can speak in both cases, in a broad 
22 Catherine Malabou. The Future of Hegel…, respectively pp. 64, 58 and 57.
23 In this case the version of PhG1 differs, as it does not include the corresponding excerpt.
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sense, of “habit”, we must distinguish the instinct of animals [Instinkt] 
from habit [Gewohnheit] properly said. The upright position, speaking, 
thinking, etc., precisely because they are (also) habits, are in no way 
conceivable as “human instincts”: Hegel’s anthropology, which avoids 
any rigid and abstract presupposition of the nature/spirit divide, at the 
same time prevents any form of naturalisation of the spiritual world.24
2. Custom
According to Hegel, humans have no instincts, but they contract hab-
its. This means that humans do not even have a true “environment” of 
life, but rather move within a spiritual world that they have constituted 
on their own: their “second nature” is society (for the moment let us 
be satisfied with the wider and more general use that can be made of 
this word). All in all, Hegel would subscribe, in spirit if not in the let-
ter, the words of Gilles Deleuze: “humans have no instincts, they build 
institutions”.25 It is now a matter of understanding the passage from the 
first formulation (“humans have no instincts, they contract habits”) to 
the second one (“humans have no instincts, they build institutions”). 
In other words, it is necessary to understand the link between the two 
thresholds that separate the spiritual [das Geistige] from the instinctual, 
that is, habit and the world of right – a link highlighted by Hegel him-
self in so far as he attributes the qualification of “second nature” to both 
of them (Enz3, §410 Anm.; GPR, §§ 4 and 151) –.
Habit, in the subjective spirit, is referred to the individual (“it is the 
most essential feature of the existence of all spiritual life [aller Geistigkeit] 
in the individual subject”, Enz3, §410 Anm.). However, in its actual-
ity, habit is always something intrinsically shared with others: “habit is 
already the habit of many” (Rph 24/25, 408). To contract a habit, in its 
Wirklichkeit, is not a process through which any empirical and acciden-
tal content is elevated to necessity, but already presupposes a developed 
spiritual world. The latter constitutes at the same time the result and 
the condition of possibility for the development of habits themselves.26 
24 This fundamental point may be missed by any so-called “naturalistic” reading of Hegel’s 
philosophy: see for instance Guido Seddone. “The Conception of Habit as a Stage of Hegel’s 
Naturalistic Theory of Mind”, Open Information Science, Vol. 2, 2018, pp. 75-82.
25 Gilles Deleuze. “Instincts et institutions (1955)”, in Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-
1974. Los Angeles, Semiotext(e), 2004, pp. 19-21, here p. 21. Deleuze would never approve 
such a reference to Hegel (whom he is careful not to include in his extensive collection). 
The reason is clear: his main philosophical reference is here David Hume, who articulates in 
another way the same theme of the relationship between habit and institution.
26 The Hegelian concept of habit is therefore completed in the political concept of custom. 
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Turning something into habit means becoming able to manifest (at the 
most different levels) a spiritual content, in the plastic sense that we 
have seen: the very essence of my habit is that it is never only mine, 
because, as we have seen, the ability to say mine is, if anything, the result 
and not the starting point. In this sense, habit is generally realized in 
the form of custom.
At first sight, custom may appear as a sort of power over the indi-
vidual similar to that of the genus over the living being, that is, custom 
could be identified with a “social instinct” proper to the human spe-
cies. One would thus associate custom with the national character of 
a people [Volksgeist], in continuity with the teaching of the German 
anthropology of the time (it suffices to think of Herder). In short: if 
animals are distinguished into species, with their specific instincts, men 
would be that species that in turn is distinguished into nations, with 
their specific customs. However, this interpretation abolishes precisely 
that gap between instinct and habit which, on the contrary, as we have 
seen, is essential for Hegel. In fact, he places the treatment of the di-
versity of national characters, as well as of races, in the subjective spirit, 
at the beginning of the chapter on the natural soul (Enz3, §§ 393-394). 
These concepts, therefore, still concern an immediate naturality (Hegel 
speaks of Naturgeister) and not habit (or actual soul). The national char-
acters are, indeed, an objective determination, but they still appear as a 
natural datum on a par with the temperament or the individual physical 
conformation; they still have nothing of that plasticity which is the sign 
of the spiritual world.27
This is confirmed by Hegel’s controversy with Savigny and the his-
torical school of law. The latter, as is well known, invoked customary 
law [Gewohnheitsrecht] against the modern idea of codification. Such an 
opposition, however, appears to Hegel to be completely wrong precisely 
because it crushes the custom into instinct. In the note to §211 of the 
Outlines, Hegel writes: “Since it is only animals which have their law as 
instinct, while human beings alone have law as custom, even customary 
The limit of Malabou’s interpretation (The Future of Hegel…) lies precisely in the fact that she 
does not focus on this relationship. Zizek seems to grasp the problem, because he extends 
Malabou’s discourse on habit in a political direction; however, he associates the concept of 
habit in Hegel (as concrete universality) with that of hegemony in Laclau (“Habit is the outcome 
of a struggle for hegemony” [Less Than Nothing…, p. 437]). This interpretation appears quite 
arbitrary in that it does not take into account the specific way in which Hegel takes up the 
concept of habit (as custom) in the Outlines of the Philosophy of Right.
27 With regard to the relationship between customs and law, Hegel identified in Montesquieu 
“the genuinely philosophical position” (GPR, §3 Anm.). Paolo. Slongo (Il movimento delle leggi. 
L’ordine dei costumi in Montesquieu. Milano, Franco Angeli, 2015) shows how Montesquieu, 
like Hegel’s later work, understands the relationship between laws and customs in an alternati-
ve way with respect to both “nomocentrism” and “ethocentrism” (see pp. 18-19).
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rights contain the moment of being thoughts and being known” (GPR, 
§211 Anm.). To think of customs as opposed to laws means, in short, to 
reduce them to the natural dimension of instinct, to abolish that differ-
ence which is manifested instead in the intrinsic capacity of customs to 
be able to be elevated to the form of the law. This means precisely that 
customs are expressions of a spiritual life which in no way can be traced 
back to a natural datum.
If habit is not instinct, then habit, as a social habit, cannot be a so-
cial instinct. This means that the costume is not identified with the 
Volksgeist, but with das Sittliche, the ethical life. When Hegel speaks of 
“ethical life”, he means nothing more than these objective relationships, 
which permeate and constitute subjects. The ethical life is neither a “na-
ture” (i.e. the customs and practices of a people) that imposes itself on 
all individuals in the same way (as it is for the abstract universality of 
genus), nor an ideal or a moral duty to which the individual is called 
to correspond. Rather, the ethical life is, for the individual, the set of 
his concrete ways of leading and acting. It is therefore not by chance 
that Bildung is defined in the same way as habit: a process of libera-
tion through which “immediacy and individuality, in which spirit is ab-
sorbed” are eliminated [weggearbeitet] and the individual obtains “the 
rationality of which it is capable” (GPR, §187 note).
This brings us to the keystone of Hegel’s philosophy of right: such 
customs have to come into existence in institutions. Custom is objec-
tive not only because it is shared, but because this sharing takes on a 
concrete existence. We have seen that social habit consists in making 
oneself capable of a universality, that is to say, in being part of a shared 
ethical element. To say that this process constitutes the basis of society 
means that this Bildung does not remain a purely subjective quality, but 
that it becomes objective in regulated social structures. It is in this very 
sense, then, that humans, since they are not confined to instincts but ac-
quire habits, realise institutions. In other words, if “costume exists essen-
tially as the ethicality of many individuals”, if therefore “habit is already 
the habit of many” (Rph 24/25, 408), then this “common” [Gemeinsames] 
must find its specific mode of existence: it must institute itself. It is here, 
in conclusion, that we can understand the Hegelian concept of right: it 
is the institutional realization of ethical relations, that is, of customs.28
28 On the relationship between ethical life and institution see Jean-François Kervégan. “La 
razionalità normativa. Spunti hegeliani”, Filosofia politica, Vol. 20, Nº 1, 2016, pp. 59-74, in 
particular pp. 71-74. The proximity, which Kervégan suggests, between Hegel and the institu-
tionalism of Maurice Hauriou should be further discussed.
100
Pierpaolo Cesaroni / Conceptos Históricos 6 (9): 86-109
Right is therefore realised in the ethical institutions that articulate the 
“rich inward articulation” and the “determinate distinctions between the 
circles of public” (GPR, 9): first of all the family, an ethical structure that 
organises immediate or intimate relationships; then, above all, the corpo-
ration, that organises the relationships that are mediated by the system of 
needs and work (the State will be discussed later). When Hegel speaks 
of corporation and community [Gemeinde],29 he does not have in mind 
what will later be called “corporate state”, that is, a top-down organisa-
tion based on a vaguely organicistic inspiration. The concept of corpora-
tion, in Hegel, has a well-defined meaning: in it comes into existence 
something that is in common among some individuals [das Gemeinsame] 
(GPR, §251), that is, the specific shared spaces that inevitably emerge 
within the system of needs (precisely in the second Stand). This “com-
mon” is neither an economic interest30 nor an extrinsic moral ideal that 
should be opposed to individual selfishness; rather, Hegel defines it as the 
sharing of a “way of life” (Lebensweise, GPR, §253 Anm.). Consequently, 
corporations cannot be established from above, by the State, which will, 
if anything, be called upon to recognize them, but are produced from 
the very same subjects involved. The subjects are called to activate what 
could be defined as their intrinsic instituting power, that is, the capacity 
to recognise their own ethical relations and bring them into existence. 
The logic that inspires Hegel’s discourse on the corporation, even beyond 
his letter, is that of a self-institution of the social, of a continuous prolif-
eration of ethical institutions. Evidently, this means that the corporation 
(like all the other figures of right) exists only as a process, never as a sim-
ple being: if the shared habit that enlivens it becomes “entirely objective”, 
that is, if “the spiritual activity has disappeared”, then what remains is 
only an empty and dead simulacrum (Rph 24/25, 407-408).
3. Man, Population, Police
The analysis that has been carried out so far is partial, as it does not 
take into account a typical phenomenon of modern societies: the 
29 See Rph 24/25, 621-622.
30 The un-awareness of this difference leads to a misinterpretation of the corporation, ac-
cording to which it is only referred to the problem of poverty: see for instance Joel Anderson. 
“Hegel’s Implicit View on How to Solve the Problem of Poverty: The Responsible Consumer 
and the Return of the Ethical to Civil Society”, in Robert R. Williams (ed.): Beyond Liberalism 
und Communitarianism: Studies in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. New York, State University 
Press of New York, 2001, pp. 185-205; Frank Ruda. Hegel’s Rabble: An Investigation into 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. London, Continuum, 2011, chapter 3.
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development of the “System of Needs”. According to Hegel, the devel-
opment of such a system is connected to the emergence of the modern 
principle of subjectivity and is therefore an inevitable part of modern 
societies. It in turn establishes a “second nature”, however in a different 
sense from that which we have seen so far.
The system of needs is characterized, on the one hand, by the multi-
plication, abstraction and refinement of needs (GPR, §190-191); on the 
other, by the development of an even greater mutual interdependence 
in the ways of their satisfaction (GPR, §192). This process of unstop-
pable enlargement and refinement separates man from nature, that 
is, it elevates him above animal life. In fact, “an animal’s needs and its 
ways and means of satisfying them are both alike restricted in scope” 
GPR, §190). Man, on the other hand, multiplies and transforms his 
own needs to the point that the natural element becomes second-
ary compared to the spiritual element of representation (GPR, §194). 
With a trivial example: clothing is less and less a means of defending 
oneself from the cold or the rain, and more and more a means of self-
representation and social recognition. However, this process is still, in 
another way, bound to the horizon of naturality: needs, however ab-
stract and interdependent they may be, therefore free of any anchorage 
to the presupposed naturalness of a genus, are nevertheless still needs. 
From this point of view, the gap between “first” and “second nature” 
is reformulated as follows: man has no (pre-determined) instincts, he 
creates and produces his own instincts (as “social needs”, GPR, §194). 
What is produced is therefore, to use an expression of Hegel’s Phenom-
enology, a “spiritual animal kingdom”.
This system, inasmuch as it does not leave the dimension of need, 
produces a different subjectivation with respect to the ethical one: it 
produces individuals who act outside any space of sharing, that is, with-
out customs (if the precise meaning attributed to this term is held firm). 
We have seen that Hegel’s anthropology, to the extent that it is centred 
on habit, leaves no room for the appearance of the figure of man (as a 
man “in general” endowed with his own nature). With the historical de-
velopment of the system of needs, it is precisely this figure that instead 
appears on the scene: “this is the first time, and indeed properly the 
only time, to speak of the human being [Mensch]” (GPR, §190 Anm.). 
The huge process of multiplication and mediation of needs typical of 
modern societies produces a space for action which, from Hegel’s point 
of view, could appear paradoxical: it is occupied by abstractions (indi-
viduals without ethical relations, without customs) which, however, are 
concretely operative. Man is a historical product: it is born when the 
subject is separated from his structurally social dimension, made up of 
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habits (i.e. common elements assumed by the subject as shared) and 
reduced to a simple individual, i.e. a simple living being.
The “second nature” that identifies with the system of needs is there-
fore, after all, homogeneous with the first nature. Consequently, the 
system of needs will produce a universality that imitates the power of 
genus over the living beings: an extrinsic universality, a regulation that 
imposes itself from the outside, with its inflexible necessity, on the social 
actors and that, just like genus, “is maintained only through the ruin of 
individuals”. This abstract universality will come into concrete existence 
in the form of institutions. However, they will be very strange institu-
tions, almost monstrous, because they will not be ethical institutions 
(they are not the objectification of common ways of life), but they will 
follow another logic, which differs from what we have seen so far. Hegel 
mainly identifies two of them.
The first of these institutions is the market itself, with its intrinsic 
mechanisms resulting from the representation of the free play of indi-
vidual wills that participate in the general wealth of society (organiza-
tion of factory work, machinery, accumulation of capital, competitive 
mechanism, etc.: all of these aspects were explored by Hegel in his les-
sons on the philosophy of right in the 1820s). In order to overcome the 
excessive inequalities deriving from the operation of the “blind” uni-
versality (GPR, §236 Anm.) of the market (in short, to regulate it), a 
second institution is required. However, it will operate in accordance 
with a logic that is indistinguishable from that of the first one: the police 
(GPR, §230). This term is used by Hegel in the sense of the eighteenth-
century Polizeiwissenschaft, inasmuch as it concerns the administrative 
activity aimed at promoting the well-being of the individuals, that is, in 
Hegelian terms, “the possibility of sharing in the general wealth” (GPR, 
§237): economic policies aimed at regulating production and trade, gen-
eral administration of the State, public health, and in part also social 
policies of wealth redistribution (although Hegel does not look kindly 
upon this last point: GPR, §245).
In the action of the police an unethical way of operating of the State 
emerges, which Hegel defines as Notstaat or Verstandesstaat (“the exter-
nal state, the state based on need, the state as the understanding envis-
ages it”: GPR, §183). Hegel also speaks of “police government” (Regieren 
der Polizei: Rph 24/25, 592) which has the double function of regulating 
the conditions for the participation of each person in the overall wealth 
and of supervising the dynamics of public utility. In other words, police 
government is exercised over omnes et singulatim, over each and every 
one. This way of existence of the modern State, articulated by the con-
nection “system of needs – police”, does not consider the dimension of 
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habit properly said, not because it does not imply (and does not pro-
duce) individual norms of life, but because it abolishes the process of 
their subjective institution. If anything, then, we will speak of Abrich-
tung, training, more than of Gewohnheit, habit. The government of the 
police “operates in the way of a necessity of nature [Naturnotwendig-
keit]” (Rph 24/25, 594): in short, it is that government of the living that 
Foucault will define as biopolitical governmentality.31
4. Political Government
According to Hegel, the modern State necessarily develops within it-
self the system that we have schematically reconstructed: the system 
which is articulated into the concept of individual (alongside the cor-
relative one of population), on the one hand, and into that of police, on 
the other. This is, in short, what Foucault in his analysis will define as 
“biopolitical governmentality”. Nevertheless, according to Hegel, this 
system, however necessary, cannot exhaust the actuality of the modern 
State. In it, only the “external or intellectualistic” side of the State (the 
Notstaat) is realized (GPR, §183); if the State identifies entirely with 
this device, then it loses its rationality, because ethical life is dissolved.
That is why Hegel insists on showing the need for corporations with-
in the modern state. In his 1824/25 lectures, indeed, he states that “the 
task of the present time is to establish corporations” (Rph 24/25, 619). 
The sense of these institutions, as we have already noted, is not to “bri-
dle” individuals within disciplinary mechanisms; on the contrary, the 
corporation plays the part of bringing out and realizing the customs, or 
shared ways of life, which, according to Hegel, also innervate modern 
societies. The representation of civil society as a pure and simple “sys-
tem of needs”, populated by unrelated subjects (therefore disciplined as 
individuals and governed as a population), is in fact only an abstraction. 
In its Wirklichkeit, the system of needs always produces also customs, 
common spheres of action and life, which must find effective institu-
tional existence. In other words, according to Hegel, the corporation 
carries out the task of articulating a form of subjectivation that differs 
from that which reduces men solely to a correlatum of disciplinary and 
liberal governmentality.
31 The main reference is here to Michel Foucault. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the 
Collège de France 1977-1978. London, Palgrave, 2007. On this point see Sandro Chignola. 
Foucault más allá de Foucault. Una política de la filosofía. Buenos Aires, Cactus, 2018.
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However, Hegel’s discourse does not limit itself to that. For poli-
tics to maintain its rationality, for politics to exist beyond its reduction 
to biopolitical governmentality, it is not enough to put into play, with 
the corporation, a political subjectivation that resists being reduced to 
a correlate of the action of police government. The real issue at stake 
in Hegel’s philosophy of right lies in another reason: the need to con-
ceive government in another way. If it is true, as Bruno Karsenti has 
pointed out, that the Hegelian conception of the State reveals a “lit-
erally unheard character” in relation to the modern representation of 
statehood,32 then this unheard character concerns precisely the question 
of government. If, today, we reread Hegel’s philosophy of right, we do 
not find any useful element to answer the question: “how is it possible 
to resist government?”. However, we do find in it some useful resources 
in response to a more complex and radical question: “What is a politi-
cal government?”. In fact, when Hegel states that the State is in itself 
an ethical institution, he is saying that the State cannot be reduced to 
Notstaat, that is to say, to police government, to the external regulation 
of individuals and the population; on the contrary, the government con-
stitutes itself as an ethical relationship.
In Hegel, the political State does not coincide with the expression 
of a sovereign will,33 but with a process of mediation between the dif-
ferent circles that make up the Verfassung. Certainly, the State is also 
a subject (in front of the other States) and the power of the crown has 
precisely the role of making the State exist in this form. However, ac-
cording to Hegel, the rationality of the State depends on the other two 
powers, which together define the mode of existence of a political gov-
ernment. The existence of different circles (mainly corporations) puts 
forth the need to continuously produce their ideality, that is, their be-
ing part of a whole. This process cannot obviously be produced within 
particular corporations and communities, but requires a specific space 
of existence, which is represented by the “legislative power” (GPR, 
§298). Evidently, this implies the existence of a specific institution, 
the power of government, that can assume such a leading function. If, 
however, this universal point of view must also be ethical, then it must 
32 See Bruno Karsenti. “Eticità e anomia”, Filosofia politica, Vol. 20, Nº 1, 2016, pp. 25-36.
33 The political institutions of today’s democratic states (mainly modern parliaments) are not 
ethical institutions, because they are based on an abstract universality (the general will of the 
people) that inevitably stands against the will of individuals (individuals). From Hegel’s point of 
view, the conceptual logic underlying modern democracy is still an expression of the Notstaat, 
not of the politischer Staat. On this crucial point, which here cannot be dealt with in its bre-
adth, see Giuseppe Duso. Libertà e costituzione in Hegel. Milano, Franco Angeli, 2013 and 
Pierpaolo Cesaroni. Governo e costituzione in Hegel. Le Lezioni di filosofia del diritto. Milano, 
Franco Angeli, 2006.
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present itself as inherent in the particularity in which it manifests it-
self. For this reason, this process cannot be reduced to the bare action 
of government, but implies a further institution (the assembly of the 
Estates, ständische Versammlung) which participates in the activity of 
unification, thus making it a shared process of mediation and con-
sensus (the “continuous production of the State in general and of its 
constitution”, of which §541 of the Encyclopaedia speaks). The proper 
political value of particular institutions (corporations, communities), 
therefore, lies not so much in the conquest of spaces of autonomy or 
self-government (although this aspect is also present), but rather in 
the definition of a political dynamic in which the governed (the self-
established institutions of the particular) are political subjects and 
acquire a capacity for action within the overall process, which thus 
qualifies as actual (ethical) mediation and unification.
Thus, in the Hegelian State, two different logics of government ap-
pear: on the one hand, the one in which governmental action is faced 
with corporations, which will necessarily configure a process of difficult 
search for mediation and consensus; on the other hand, the one in which 
governmental action is faced with irrelated individuals and which will 
therefore be configured as an extrinsic regulation. On the one hand the 
political State, on the other the State of necessity.34 The way in which 
Hegel observes the political situation of his time suggests that he is 
concerned about the unilateral imposition of one logic to the detriment 
of the other. In his 1824/25 lectures he seems to grasp two main prob-
lems of the present time: on the one hand, the absence of corporations 
(Rph 24/25, 619); on the other hand, the fact that “police governance 
can go too far” because it does not contain any Grenze, any intrinsic 
limit (Rph 24/25, 592). The two phenomena are mutually supportive in 
that they contribute correlatively to the omni-pervasive imposition of 
the police State at the expense of the political one. In other words, the 
two logics of government are not only incompatible, but they are in a 
relationship of inverse proportionality: the more institutions there are, 
the less population there is; the more political government there is, the 
less police there is. There is no doubt that for Hegel the action of police 
government is to a certain extent necessary, because the development of 
some aspects of modern society intrinsically requires it (economic and 
health policies, infrastructures, etc.); it is equally certain, however, that 
34 Stephen Houlgate (“Right and Trust in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right”, Hegel Bulletin, Vol.37, 
Nº 1, 2016, pp. 104-116) rightly states that, according to Hegel, freedom really only takes pla-
ce within institutions, not against them. However, in his reading Houlgate does not bring out 
a fundamental point in this regard: this is possible only if institutions are ethical, that is, if they 
express an actual universality.
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where there are no more corporations, where there is no longer a pro-
cess of institutionalizing shared customs, then the State becomes simple 
Notstaat and loses its most proper rationality.
At this point it is well understood how the Hegelian indication that 
“the task of the present is to establish corporations” should be read (Rph 
24/25, 619). It is not a question of administrative reforms or of the sup-
port for a corporate State, but of the capacity of subjects to activate (and 
to keep constantly active) what could be defined as their intrinsic insti-
tutional power, that is, to recognise and bring into existence their own 
ethical relations, the customs that constitute them, that is, their own 
common ways of life. The political stakes involved in these institutions 
are not to be understood as a claim for autonomy, as a withdrawal from 
the dynamics of government: in this case, the government would end up 
being identified entirely with the police. The point is rather the opening 
and widening of a different logic of government, which for Hegel con-
stitutes the actuality, the Wirklichkeit, of the State: that in which the 
course of the constitution is articulated as a continuous process of medi-
ation between the differentiated demands of the governed [Ständever-
sammlung] and the demand for their fair unification [Regierungsgewalt].
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